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Patent Cases in the District
Courts-Who Should Hear Them?
JUDGE ABRAHAM LINCOLN MAROVITZ*

I am honored to join in a symposium with my beloved and esteemed
friend, John S. Hastings, a former Chief Judge of the 7th Circuit and
one of the most respected judges in the country. However, I am not so
immodest as to believe that I was invited to contribute to this symposium because of my fame as the Holmes or the Brandeis of the patent
field. On the contrary-the genesis of my invitation can be directly
traced, I am confident, to my own protestations of gross inadequacy
in the patent area, a disclaimer I voiced in a letter published in the
American Bar Association Journal in response to an article by Richard
Gausewitz.'
I sometimes think that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had judges like
me in mind, when he stated in his dissent in Marconi Wireless Co. v.
United States2 that "it is an old observation that the training of the
Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon
them by patent legislation." 3 That observation was voiced by Justice
Frankfurter in 1943 and to a certain degree is as true today as it
was thirty years ago. Why is it so; why should it be so; and what is
the remedy?
Before I discuss the various cures that have been prescribed for
what might be called critical judicial dysfunction in the patent area, it
would be well to define the extent and essence of the illness. I might
interject here that whatever I have to say is by no means a criticism
of the patent bar and should not be taken as such, but rather as a single
judge's frank, perhaps too frank, observations about his own inadequacies and those of the judicial system. The problem is obviously a
multi-faceted one which brings into question, not only the relationship
between judges and patent cases, but the structure of the judicial system
as a whole as it exists in all areas of the law.
Since it was Mr. Gausewitz's article which precipitated my letter
to the Journal, I would like to use that article as a starting point for
this discussion. Gausewitz divides the members of the bench into two
* United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
1 Gausewitz, Toward Patent Experienced Judges, 58 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1972).

2 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
3 Id. at 60-61.
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classes: "patent-oriented judges," that is, those judges who have either
had patent experience prior to their elevation to the bench, or who have
gained proficiency in patent litigation while on the bench, and "patentinexperienced judges,"-the latter category numbering myself among
its cowardly and swollen ranks.4 The irony of it all is that while I do
consider myself to be a patent-inexperienced judge, I do feel, and please
excuse my lack of modesty, that I am otherwise an experienced trial
judge equipped to handle any type of case which might arise, having
presided over thousands of trials during my fourteen years as a trial
judge in the state courts and my twelve years as a federal district court
judge-in addition to almost 25 years experience as an active trial
lawyer. Why then do I fear patent cases and things that go "bump, in
the night?" Answering this question will define the basis of the problem.
In the Northern District of Illinois cases are assigned by lot. Each
judge's name is printed on a card and placed in a sealed deck with each
judge's name appearing an equal number of times. When a case is
filed, a card is torn from the sealed deck and attached to the complaint.
Theoretically, each judge is assigned the same number of cases in an
equal number of areas. Thus the assignment of a patent case is completely fortuitous. Before taking senior status in August, when I drew
an antitrust case, a multi-defendant criminal case, or an involved securities case, I was unperturbed. Nevertheless, when I drew a patent case,
to be perfectly honest, I was less than overjoyed. I envisioned inordinate amounts of trial time, mountains of documents, reams of testimony,
countless mysterious diagrams, and endless verbal duels between experts
who speak in a foreign tongue and write in an alien language. I was
overcome by a feeling that I was being compelled to perform in a role
for which I was dreadfully ill prepared, and to witness the judicial
system operating at its poorest. I might venture to gness that these
feelings are not unusual among patent-inexperienced judges in the federal judiciary.
What is it that distinguishes patent suits from antitrust, criminal,
securities, and other federal matters? First and foremost is the time
element. The cardinal concept that lies at the very foundation of the
entire judicial system, with its provision for pre-trial procedures, its
provision for summary disposal at various junctures, its encouragement
of settlement, and its countenancing of plea bargaining, is the resolution of conflict, short of trial, and the conservation of judicial time.
Time, in our overtaxed and undermanned judicial system, is the rarest
and scarcest of commodities. As our hypertechnological age, our ex4 Gausewitz, supra note 1, at 1087.
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panding economic frontiers, and our decaying moral fibre generate litigation in a rising geometric progression, court calendars swell until
they burst at their seams, and dockets overload until they collapse under
their own weight. The cries of indignation about court delay and denial of speedy trials are heard in the halls of justice until the word
comes down from on high that all civil litigation must be suspended in
order to try criminal cases. Despite these difficulties, a judge's calendar,
if it is operating properly, runs like a finely tuned instrument, processing
and disposing of litigation in a timely and orderly fashion-for justice
delayed is indeed justice denied, no matter how small or large the case
may be. Any matter that consumes vast amounts of time-time that is
not utilized in its most efficient manner-poses a threat to the fine calibration of that instrument.
Patent suits, both intrinsically and extrinsically, pose just such
a threat. That such actions fly in the face of that cardinal rule regarding time conservation is not due to any fault inherent in patent litigation, but rather to defects in the judicial system itself. At the outset,
the very nature of a patent case requires significant amounts of time.
These cases often involve multiple defendants and huge amounts of
money, and require lengthy, complicated trials. It was these characteristics that led the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University Foundation5 to observe that patent cases "seem to
take an inordinate amount of trial time"6 and that
while the three year trend in the district courts appears to be toward
more expeditious handling of civil cases tried without a jury in terms
of an annual increase in the percentage of cases concluded in three
trial days or less and an overall decrease in percentage of cases requiring 10 or more days, the trends in patent litigation are exactly
contrary.7
Nevertheless, there is something beyond the outward appearance
of patent cases that is responsible for the large amounts of time necessary. Antitrust and securities cases are also inherently time consuming. They too involve multiple defendants and plaintiffs and large
amounts of money, yet they are resolved more efficiently than patent
cases. Why? The simple answer is that a judge has encountered the
elements of these areas of law on numerous occasions, both in his practice prior to being appointed to the bench, and afterwards, and he is
therefore intimately familiar with their terms, language, and underlying circumstances. Patent litigation, on the other hand, is infrequently
5402 U.S. 313 (1971).

61d. at 337.
7 Id. at n.31.
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encountered by judges and even less frequently, if ever, dealt with by
practicing non-patent lawyers. Keeping in mind that it is judicial time
which is of the essence, let us examine the decisional process.
The judicial system as it is designed (and this may be an oversimplification) has three stages. The first step is the determination of
the facts. The second, the choice of applicable statutory or case law.
The third step is the superimposition of the former over -the latter.
Thus, when the facts conform to a certain blueprint of applicable law,
a decision is reached. Of course, no body of law can anticipate every
set of circumstances, and judges must, at times, create new law by carving out exceptions and analogizing to other areas of the law. In most
cases, this process is not a difficult one, given the fact that the terms
involved are merely common everyday language converted to legal usage.
The commonness of the language and a judge's familiarity with the
underlying circumstances, having encountered them in his prior practice, combine to render most areas of the law comprehensible. The
issues may be complex but the language is universal. Thus, the concepts of the "reasonable man," "criminal intent," "monopolization,"
and "insider information" are employed and interpreted in terms of
past experience and the language of life.
Patent cases are an entirely different matter. Rather than requiring three steps in the decisional process, they require four-that additional step taking more time than the other three combined. Aside
from discerning the facts and segregating the law, a judge must learn
an entirely new technical and foreign language-call it "patenteese" if
you will. It is principally the language of physics, chemistry, and engineering-a language with which the judge has no familiarity-both in
regard to underlying circumstances, and to the very terms used. It is a
jargon in which a judge must be reeducated before he can proceed to
properly understand the basic facts and to render a proper decision.
I am not trying to be facetious when I draw this analogy: most
cases are in English, but in patent litigation it is as if the judge is suddenly required to learn Chinese in order to decide a case. Granted,
given enough time a judge can obtain a working knowledge of the
new language, but in a system where time is of the essence, why should
he be required to expend the vast amount of time necessary to do so,
especially when there are far more expeditious alternatives? I therefore respectfully disagree with the statement made a couple of years
ago by former Judge Simon Rifkind, a most respected and exceptionally talented jurist now in private practice, that there is nothing peculiarly esoteric about the patent law. Judge Rifkind maintained that
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the pure patent case is rare, and that most patent cases today are a
combination of elements with which most judges are familiar, such as
fraud, contracts, and antitrust, and that a judge should be able within
a short time to sufficiently train himself to understand those few principles of patent law applicable to his case. He further stated: "Patent
law is no more difficult of comprehension than the antitrust law or the
securities law or any other branch of the law. It can be read."' Granted,
a judge can train himself to understand the principles of patent law,
and the patent law can be read. I have no difficulty with the patent
law, but the patent facts cannot be read, and the application of law to
those facts, absent a knowledge of "patenteese," a knowledge that takes
more than a short time to obtain, presents a difficult problem. One cannot suddenly have thrust upon him a complex chemical formula, an
intricate device, or an involved piece of machinery, and expect to have
a "feel" for its unique characteristics or to deal with the concept of its
inventiveness. It is for this very reason that most patent lawyers have
undergraduate degrees in some technological area, and no securities or
antitrust lawyer, who majored in political science, would ever think of
switching to patent law in mid-career. By the same token, someone
seeking to litigate a patent would never go to a real estate lawyer for
representation. Therefore, I do not believe that justice is best served
by requiring patent clients and patent lawyers to try their cases before
"patent-ignorant" judges.
I agree wholeheartedly that a federal judge, given his exalted position, should be a good enough lawyer to handle anything that comes
his way-and that there is a great danger in segmenting the courts
and judges into specialized areas-but such statements beg the question. The issue is not whether a judge can or ought to train himself
to properly handle patent cases, but rather whether he should be required to do so given the large amount of time it requires. My thesis
then, given the critical drain on judicial time that can be attributed to
assignment of patent cases to patent-inexperienced judges, given the
uniqueness of patent litigation, and given the alternatives for the preservation of that time, is that patent cases should not be assigned to
patent-inexperienced judges.
What are the available alternatives? Several have been suggested.
One plan attributed to Judge Caleb Wright of the district court in
Delaware would have each district court employ an expert technical
consultant whom the judge would consult after hearing all of the
evidence. That plan does not appeal to me since I believe that the
s Rifkind, Improving the Patent System, 1972 APLA BuLL. 604, 683.
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delegation of any element of the decisional process should be avoided,
and the use of the technological interpreter comes too close to allowing
such a delegation. The unavailability of adverse cross-examination is
a second key consideration in rejecting this proposal.
Another suggested alternative is the hearing of patent suits by a
three-judge court, with one judge being patent-oriented. Although such
a plan has some merit, it conflicts with the preservation of judicial time.
Three-judge courts are peculiar institutions. They involve scheduling
problems, since three judges must be able to agree on a given time for
trial and, furthermore, they have a tendency to shift responsibility from
a single judge as such to the entity of a three-judge court-an entity
that seems to exist independent of the individual judges involved. A
judge on a three-judge court often never really feels that the case is
his, but rather that it belongs to the "three-judge court." In addition, it
seems unwise to require the time of three judges, when one patentoriented judge could do an adequate job by himself.
A third proposed plan, and probably the most common one, is the
creation of a specialized patent court to deal with all patent trials.
That plan too falls short of accomplishing what is necessary.
I find Mr. Gausewitz's recommendation,' one I have advocated
for many years, the most appealing. It calls for the appointment, in
the large metropolitan multi-judge districts, of one or two patent lawyers
to that district court as judges, and either assignment of all patent
cases to them, or provision for an option available to judges in their
respective districts to whom the case may have been assigned, to either
hear or decline to hear patent cases. If they decline, the case is assigned
to one of the patent judges. Such a system would free patent-inexperienced judges to uncrowd their overloaded dockets and would be a great
benefit, not only to the just and speedy resolution of patent cases, but
to the judicial system as a whole.
9 See

Gausewitz, supra note 1, at 1089-90.

